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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Cesar Antonio Sepulveda appeals from the judgment entered upon the
jury verdict finding him guilty of felony intimidating a witness and misdemeanor
domestic battery, injury to child and two counts of attempted violation of a no
contact order.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Connie Grainger lived next door to Sepulveda and L.M. and their children.
(8/11/14 Tr., p. 144, L. 2 - p. 146, L. 10.) On the morning of December 27,
2013, Ms. Grainger heard Sepulveda and L.M. arguing outside of their
apartment. (8/11/14 Tr., p. 148, L. 18 - p. 149, L. 25.) Ms. Grainger recalled
they were arguing about whether L.M. had been unfaithful to Sepulveda while he
was in jail. (Id.) Sepulveda and L.M. continued arguing as they went into their
apartment. (8/11/14 Tr., p. 150, Ls. 1-17.) Ms. Grainger then described what
she heard:
Q.

Would you describe for us what you heard.

A.
I heard a really loud bang. It sounded like they were going
to come through my wall. And then right after I heard that, I heard
one of the little kids that said - sorry, "Daddy, please don't kill
mommy." And that's when I decided to call 911.
(8/11/14 Tr., p. 150, Ls. 10-17.) Ms. Grainger could hear the children screaming
and she thought L.M. was being killed. (8/11/14 Tr., p. 151, Ls. 6-9.) She could
hear the children screaming, "Stop," and she heard L.M. say, "Help me,
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somebody help me, please. He is going to kill me." (8/11/14 Tr., p. 152, Ls. 916.) Ms. Grainer called 911. (8/11/14 Tr., p. 153, L. 15-p.155, L.15; Ex. 2.)
The state charged Sepulveda in Case No. CR-FE-2013-008132 with
attempted strangulation and misdemeanor injury to child. 1 (R., pp. 8-9, 49-51,
56-58, 166-167.)

The magistrate issued a no contact order preventing

Sepulveda from having any contact with L.M. (R., p. 14.) The no contact order
was later amended to prevent Sepulveda from having contact with child victims
as well. (R., p. 48.)
While Sepulveda was in custody, the jail recorded phone calls in which
Sepulveda attempted to contact L.M. through third parties and tried to get L.M. to
say the allegations against him were false or else not to show up for court. (R.,
pp. 246-247.) The state charged Sepulveda in Case No. CR-FE-2014-0001189
with felony intimidating, impeding, influencing or preventing attendance of a
witness and two counts of attempted violation of a no contact order.2 (Id.)
The magistrate ordered the two cases consolidated.

1

(R., p. 41. 3)

On

Sepulveda was originally also charged with felony possession of a controlled
substance, possession of drug paraphernalia and two additional counts of
misdemeanor injury to child, but these counts were dismissed prior to trial. (See
R., pp. 166-167.)
2 Case No. CR-FE-2014-0001189 is contained in the clerk's record from pages
241-474.
3 The record is not clear why the cases were not consolidated immediately after
the magistrate entered the order. (R., p. 41.) However, after the two cases were
bound over, the state again moved to consolidate the two cases. (R., pp. 298300.) At that time, the district court recognized that the magistrate's order had
already consolidated the cases, and the cases were consolidated. (6/20/14 Tr.,
p.19, Ls. 13-21.)
2

February 28, 2014, the magistrate held separate preliminary hearings for each
case. (R., pp. 45-47, 272.) L.M. testified that Sepulveda took her by the neck,
got on top of her, and choked her with two hands. (2/28/14 Tr., p. 11, Ls. 3-16. 4)
L.M. testified she was unable to breathe and thought she was going to die.
(2/28/14 Tr., p. 11, L. 23- p. 12, L. 1.) The magistrate bound over both cases.
(R., pp. 45-47, 272.)
Prior to trial, L.M. committed suicide by overdosing on methamphetamine
and two drugs for which she had a prescription. (R., pp. 82-83; 8/11/14 Tr., p.
10, L. 18 - p. 15, L. 7.) The state filed a pretrial motion to allow it to introduce
L.M.'s preliminary hearing transcript at trial pursuant to Idaho Rule of Evidence
804(b)(1 ).

(R., pp. 88-133, 138-151, 312-357, 360-373.)

The district court

granted the state's motion. (7/25/14 Tr., p. 34, L. 4 - p. 37, L. 16.) The district
court held that Sepulveda had an adequate opportunity to cross-examine L.M.
and Sepulveda was not foreclosed from pursuing his line of questioning at the
preliminary hearing. (Id.)
The state also filed a Motion in Limine Regarding the Suicide of [L.M.] to
exclude any reference to the cause or manner of L.M.'s death. (R., pp. 160-161,
386-387.)

The state argued that L.M.'s suicide months after the fact was

irrelevant to the trial. (8/11/14 Tr., p. 10, L. 18 - p. 15, L. 7.) The district court
held that while the cause of L.M.'s death would not be told to the jury, the jury

Unless otherwise indicated, all February 28, 2014 transcript citations are
citations to the preliminary hearing in CR-FE-2013-18132.
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would be told that her death had nothing whatsoever to do with this case.
(8/11/14 Tr., p. 14, L. 21 - p. 15, L. 7.)
At trial, the neighbor, Ms. Grainger, testified that she heard the children
screaming, "Daddy, please don't kill mommy," and L.M. imploring for help.
(8/11/14 Tr., p. 143, L. 17 - p. 155, L. 15.) The state also introduced a recording
of Ms. Grainger's 911 call. (8/11/14 Tr., p. 153, L. 18 - p. 154, L. 25; Ex. 2.)
The state introduced an underacted recording of L.M.'s preliminary
hearing testimony into evidence. (8/11/14 Tr., p. 162, L. 18 - p. 163, L. 7.) After
playing the audio, the district court instructed the jury that L.M. had died, but her
death did not have anything to do with this case or Sepulveda. (8/11/14 Tr., p.
163, Ls. 8-24.)
Jaxon Bates, a paramedic, testified that paramedics responded to the
scene and observed swelling on L.M.'s neck and under her chin. (8/11/14 Tr., p.
168, Ls. 9-18.) The paramedics advised L.M. to go to the hospital. (8/11/14 Tr.,
p. 168, Ls. 23-25.) The paramedics observed that L.M. was "emotionally upset
but was breathing normally with some minor swelling under her jaw and some
minor pain and difficulty when she swallowed." (8/11/14 Tr., p. 181, L. 19 - p.
182, L. 1.) The paramedics also did not observe any signs of intoxication in L.M.
(8/11/14, Tr., p. 182, L. 14 - p. 183, L. 2.)
Officer Chally testified that Sepulveda's injuries were consistent with
injuries caused while he was attacking L.M. (8/12/14 Tr., p. 215, L. 21 - p. 216,
L. 6.)

Sepulveda's injuries were consistent with injuries inflicted by someone

who was trying to get away or defend herself from Sepulveda. (8/12/14 Tr., p.
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218, Ls. 15-23.) The state also introduced an additional 911 call made by L.M.
later in the afternoon of December 27th, in which she requested to go to the
hospital. (8/12/14 Tr., p. 231, Ls. 8-20; Ex. 18.)
The state played jail phone recordings in which Sepulveda talked to L.M.'s
sister, Kayla Welch, and he explained how it would be better if L.M. told the court
that L.M. made it all up and it was not his fault. (8/12/14 Tr., p. 249, L. 12 - p.
250, L. 25, p. 263, L. 9 - p. 264, L. 19; Ex. 19.) Ms. Welch also testified that
when Sepulveda was in jail he requested her to get L.M. to tell the police the
allegations against him were lies. (8/12/14 Tr., p. 279, L. 25 - p. 280, L. 7.)
Ms. Welch also testified that she received a call from L.M. on the morning
of December 27, 2013, and she could hear Sepulveda in the background calling
L.M. a "bitch" and a "whore." (8/12/14 Tr., p. 275, L. 2 - p. 276, L. 1.) Ms. Welch
testified that Sepulveda and L.M. were arguing about L.M.'s supposed infidelity.
(8/12/14 Tr., p. 276, Ls. 2-6.)
The state also played a jail phone call Sepulveda made to Lisa Cameron,
the wife of Sepulveda's cellmate. (8/12/14 Tr., p. 264, L. 20 - p. 269, L. 16; Ex.
20.) During that phone call Sepulveda gave Ms. Cameron L.M.'s phone number
and told Ms. Cameron to tell L.M. that if she did not show up at the preliminary
hearing the charges would be dropped. (Id.) Two days later Sepulveda again
called Ms. Cameron and thanked her for telling his "sister" about court. (8/12/14
Tr., p. 269, L. 17 - p. 270, L. 21; Ex. 21.) Officer Green, who was monitoring the
jail phone calls, understood Sepulveda to be talking in code and the references
to his "sister" were actually references to L.M. (Id.)
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Ms. Cameron also testified and confirmed that Sepulveda called her and
wanted her to tell L.M. not show up to court and to tell L.M. to say that the reason
for the fight was because L.M. was off her medication. (8/12/14 Tr., p. 285, L. 19
- p. 288, L. 4.) Ms. Cameron testified that she passed on to L.M. everything that
Sepulveda told her to pass on. (8/12/14 Tr., p. 287, L. 25 - p. 288, L. 4.) John
Johnson, Ms. Cameron's husband and Sepulveda's cellmate, testified that he
befriended Sepulveda in jail and agreed to help him get ahold of Lisa Cameron
so she could get ahold of L.M. (8/12/14 Tr., p. 294, L. 16- p. 296, L. 12.)
Sepulveda presented evidence. The district court permitted Sepulveda to
call L.M.'s counselor, Stacy Wright, and have her testify to what L.M. told her in
counseling sessions.

(8/12/14 Tr., p. 318, L. 16 - p. 319, L. 16.) Ms. Wright

testified that L.M. had suicidal ideation and homicidal ideation. (8/12/14 Tr., p.
323, L. 21 - p. 324, L. 6.) However, Ms. Wright did not think L.M. was serious
about her homicidal ideation.

(8/12/14 Tr., p. 330, L. 20 - p. 331, L. 7.) Ms.

Wright also testified that L.M. told her that Sepulveda had strangled her and that
L.M. thought she was going to die. (8/12/14 Tr., p. 330, Ls. 1-10.) L.M. also told
Ms. Wright that her neck was sore. (8/12/14 Tr., p. 330, Ls. 15-19.)
Sepulveda also called Sara Bowman, the mother of Sepulveda's other
child. (8/12/14 Tr., p. 333, L. 24 - p. 334, L. 5.) Over the state's objection, Sara
Bowman testified that L.M. threatened to take away Sepulveda's citizenship if he
left. (8/12/14 Tr., p. 335, L. 9 - p. 336, L. 9.)
Sepulveda then testified in his own defense. (8/12/14 Tr., p. 343, L. 7 - p.
412, L. 9.) Sepulveda claimed L.M. attacked him and then attacked herself after
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he discovered a methamphetamine pipe and he threatened to call Child
Protective Services on her.

(8/12/14 Tr., p. 347, L. 12 - p. 350, L. 23.)

Sepulveda testified that L.M. had hurt herself before. (8/13/14 Tr., p. 410, L. 12
- p. 411, L. 22.)

On cross-examination, Sepulveda admitted that he wanted Ms. Welch,
L.M.'s sister, to pass a message to L.M. in violation of the no contact order.
(8/13/14 Tr., p. 392, L. 1 - p. 394, L. 21.) Sepulveda confessed he wanted Ms.
Welch to pass a message to L.M. requesting that L.M. come to court and say
certain things. (Id.)
Also on cross-examination, Sepulveda admitted that his story regarding
the incident had changed over time. (8/13/14 Tr., p. 377, L. 19 - p. 380, L. 19, p.
408, L. 18 - p. 409, L. 7.) Sepulveda was forced to admit that, if his story was
correct, then that Ms. Grainger's testimony, L.M.'s preliminary hearing testimony,
and Mr. Johnson's testimony were all inaccurate. (8/13/14 Tr., p. 381, L. 11 - p.
382, L. 10.)
The jury found Sepulveda guilty of domestic battery; injury to a child;
intimidating, impeding, influencing or preventing attendance of a witness; and
two counts of attempted violation of a no contact order. (R., pp. 183-184, 404405.) The jury found Sepulveda not guilty on the attempted strangulation count.
(Id.)

The district court entered judgment and sentenced Sepulveda to five
years with three years fixed.

(R., pp. 456-461.)
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The district court retained

jurisdiction. (Id.) Sepulveda filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp. 236-239, pp.

463-466.)
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ISSUES
Sepulveda states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Whether the district court violated Mr. Sepulveda's constitutional
right to confront the witnesses against him when it granted the
State's motion to present L.M.'s preliminary hearing testimony
during trial even though he had not been afforded an adequate
opportunity to cross-examine L.M.

2.

Whether the district court violated Mr. Sepulveda's right to present
a defense by not allowing him to present evidence challenging
L.M.'s credibility based on its erroneous conclusion that the
evidence was irrelevant.

3.

Whether the district court violated Mr. Sepulveda's constitutional
right to be free from double jeopardy under the Idaho Constitution
by entering convictions and imposing sentences for each charge in
the 2014 case when one of those charges was alleged as a means
by which each of the other two charges was committed.

4.

Whether the accumulated errors in this case require reversal even
if this Court determines them to be individually harmless.

(Appellant's brief, p. 8.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.
Has Sepulveda failed to show the district court abused its
discretion when it determined that he had an adequate opportunity to crossexamine L.M. and permitted the state to introduce L.M.'s preliminary hearing
testimony at trial?
2.
Has Sepulveda failed to show the district court abused its
discretion when it determined that the cause of L.M.'s suicide, which occurred
seven months after the day in question, was not admissible?
3.
Has Sepulveda failed to show that felony intimidation of a witness
is a lesser included offense of misdemeanor attempted violation of a no contact
order such that a conviction for both violates double jeopardy and constitutes
fundamental error?
4.
Does Sepulveda's cumulative error claim fail because he has failed
to show error, much less multiple errors to cumulate?
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ARGUMENT
I.
Sepulveda Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It
Granted The State's Motion In Limine To Admit L.M.'s Preliminary Hearing
Testimony At Trial

A

Introduction
Sepulveda argues that the district court erred when it permitted the state

to introduce L.M.'s preliminary hearing testimony at trial. (Appellant's brief, pp.
9-15.)

Sepulveda claims he was not given an adequate opportunity to cross-

examine L.M. because the magistrate sustained the state's objection to his
question regarding whether L.M. used methamphetamine a few days before the
charged incidents.

(See id.)

The Idaho Supreme Court has outlined three

illustrative, non-exclusive factors to determine whether a party had an adequate
opportunity to cross-examine a witness.

All three of the factors indicate that

Sepulveda had an adequate opportunity to cross-examine L.M. The district did
not abuse its discretion when it granted the state's motion in limine to introduce
L.M.'s preliminary hearing testimony at trial.

B.

Standard Of Review
"Trial courts have broad discretion when ruling on a motion in limine so we

review the district court's decision to grant or deny a motion in limine for abuse of
discretion.'' State v. Richardson, 156 Idaho 524, 527-528, 328 P.3d 504, 507508 (2014) (citing Cramer v. Slater, 146 Idaho 868, 878, 204 P.3d 508, 518
(2009); Puckett v. Verska, 144 Idaho 161, 167, 158 P.3d 937, 943 (2007)). "A
trial court does not abuse its discretion if it (1) recognizes the issue as one of
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discretion, (2) acts within the boundaries of its discretion and applies the
applicable legal standards, and (3) reaches the decision through an exercise of
reason."

kl

(citing State v. Guess, 154 Idaho 521,528,300 P.3d 53, 60 (2013)

(quoting Johannsen v. Utterbeck, 146 Idaho 423, 429, 196 P.3d 341, 347
(2008)). The Court freely reviews questions of law.

kl

(citing State v. Meister,

148 Idaho 236,239, 220 P.3d 1055, 1058 (2009)).

C.

Sepulveda Had An Adequate Opportunity To Cross-Examine L.M.
'The Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause provides that, '[i]n all

criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with
the witnesses against him."' Richardson, 156 Idaho at 527-528, 328 P.3d at 507508 (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42 (2004); U.S. Const. amend.
VI).

"The Confrontation Clause 'is made obligatory on the States by the

Fourteenth Amendment."'

kl

380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965)).

at 528, 328 P. 3d at 508 (citing Pointer v. Texas,
"[T]his pmvision bars 'admission of testimonial

statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to
testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination."'

kl

at 528, 328 P. 3d at 508 (citing Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 821 (2006);
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53-54). Preliminary hearing testimony is admissible only if
the defendant had an "adequate opportunity to cross-examine."

kl

(citations

omitted).
It is undisputed that L.M.'s preliminary hearing testimony was a
"testimonial statement." See id. (the term "testimonial" applies at a minimum to
prior testimony at a preliminary hearing). Further it is undisputed that L.M. was
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unavailable for trial. (7/25/14 Tr., p. 35, Ls. 9-13.) Therefore the only question
before the district court, and on appeal, is whether Sepulveda had an adequate
opportunity for cross-examination.
Whether a party had an adequate opportunity for cross-examination is
determined on a case-by-case basis. Richardson, 156 Idaho at 529, 328 P.3d at
509 (citing State v. Mantz, 148 Idaho 303, 309, 222 P.3d 471, 477 (Ct. App.
2009)). However, the Idaho Supreme Court has identified three illustrative, nonexclusive factors to determine whether a party had an adequate opportunity to
cross-examine.

Richardson, 156 Idaho at 529, 328 P.3d at 509.

"The first

indication of an adequate opportunity to cross-examine is representation by
counsel."

Richardson, 156 Idaho at 528, 328 P.3d at 508 (citing Mantz, 148

Idaho at 306, 222 P.3d at 474; Pointer, 380 U.S. at 401-402).

A second

indication is no significant limitation "in any way in the scope or nature" of
counsel's cross-examination.

Richardson, 156 Idaho at 528-529, 328 P.3d at

508-509 (citing Mantz. 148 Idaho at 306, 222 P.3d at 474; California v. Green,
399 U.S. 149, 166 (1970)). The third indication is counsel's failure to "show any
new and significantly material line of cross-examination that was not at least
touched upon" in the preliminary hearing.

Richardson, 156 Idaho at 529, 328

P.3d at 509 (citing Mantz, 148 Idaho at 307, 222 P.3d at 475; Mancusi v. Stubbs,
408 U.S. 204, 215 (1973)). All three of these factors support the district court's
determination that Sepulveda had an adequate opportunity to cross-examine
L.M. (7/25/14 Tr., p. 35, L. 14- p. 37, L. 10.)
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1.

Sepulveda Was Represented By Counsel During L.M.'s Testimony

Sepulveda was represented by counsel at the preliminary hearing.
(2/28/14 Tr., p. 4, Ls. 4-11.) The first factor supports a finding that Sepulveda
had an adequate opportunity to cross-examine L.M.
2.

There Was No Significant Limitation On Sepulveda's Counsel's
Cross-Examination Of L.M.

At the preliminary hearing L.M. was cross-examined regarding whether
she was on any medication, the cause of the argument, details regarding the
choking, the location of the attack, why she did not immediately seek treatment,
whether she hit Sepulveda, where she scratched Sepulveda, where she hit
Sepulveda, whether she was on any medication the day of the incident, and
whether she had been treated for anything else since she went to the hospital.
(2/28/14 Tr., p. 16, L. 16 - p. 21, L. 9.)

The magistrate even permitted

Sepulveda to inquire regarding L.M.'s past history of self-harm when Sepulveda
indicated he could lay additional foundation. (2/28/14 Tr., p. 16, L. 18 - p. 17, L.
1.)

Sepulveda argues the magistrate significantly limited his counsel's ability
to cross-examine L.M. because the magistrate sustained an objection to a
question regarding L.M.'s previous drug use. (Appellant's brief, pp. 12-13.)
Q.

Now, you said you hadn't used any methamphetamine that
day. Had you a few days prior to that?

A.

Yes.

MS. FAULKNER: Objection, relevance.
MS. COSHO: I think it is relevant, Judge, as to her state of mind.
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THE COURT: A few days prior?
MS. COSHO: Yes.
THE COURT: I will sustain the objection.
(2/28/14 Tr., p. 17, Ls. 7-16.)
Sepulveda argues the sustaining of this objection prevented him from
exploring a source of potential bias and developing a credibility issue.
(Appellant's brief, pp. 12-15.)

The district court held that Sepulveda had an

adequate opportunity to cross-examine L.M. at the preliminary hearing. (7/25/14
Tr., p. 35, L. 14- p. 37, L. 10.)
And the third point is that at the preliminary hearing, the
defense had an adequate opportunity to prepare and crossexamine the witness. And on that point, it does seem clear to me
that the defense did have an adequate opportunity to examine
[L.M.] as to the events that led to the charges against Mr.
Sepulveda in this case, the alleged domestic violence incident.
There were a couple of instances in which objections were
sustained during the preliminary hearing, but I think as to one of the
those [sic] instances had to do with the allegation or the question to
[L.M.], had she ever harmed herself. Defense counsel at that
point, there's an objection to relevance, and then defense counsel
indicates that she can lay more foundation. And the court sustains
the objection and essentially invites defense counsel to lay more
foundation.
And I think defense counsel went a different direction and
didn't come back to that point. I'm not sure it is true that the
defense was truly foreclosed from pursuing that line of questioning
during the preliminary hearing.
In any event, it does appear to me that there was enough
information available to the defense in terms of what was alleged to
have happened in the underlying incident and the medical
consequences to the victim to be able to prepare to cross-examine
the witness.
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To the extent Rule 804(b)(1) of the Idaho Rules of Evidence
bears on this point, it seems to kind of co-occupy this topic with
Idaho Code 9-336. The issue under that rule would be whether
defense counsel had a similar motive to develop testimony during
the preliminary hearing as you would have at trial. And that
certainly seems to be the case, that there would be a qualifying
similar motive here. And the Richardson case would also suggest
that that would be the correct conclusion in this instance.
So in the end, I have a hard time seeing how this situation
winds up being different in any material way than the situation that
the Idaho Supreme Court confronted in the Richardson case and
concluded that the preliminary hearing testimony was proper to be
admitted into evidence.
(7/25/14 Tr., p. 35, L. 14- p. 37, L. 10.)
On appeal Sepulveda claims the district court erred because,
contends,

he

"[T]he Idaho Supreme Court has expressly held that cross-

examination into the witness' drug history as a source of potential bias is a
relevant inquiry and the presence of such an inquiry indicates that the
opportunity to cross-examine was adequate."

(Appellant's brief, p. 13 (citing

Richardson, 156 Idaho at 529, 328 P.3d at 509; Mantz, 148 Idaho at 310-311,
222 P.3d at 478-479).) Neither the holding in Richardson nor in Mantz supports
Sepulveda's conclusion that a cross-examination is not adequate if the
defendant does not inquire into the witness's drug history.
In Richardson, the state charged Richardson with three counts of delivery
of a controlled substance. Richardson, 156 Idaho at 526, 328 P.3d at 506. The
charges were based on drug purchases made by Robert Bauer, a confidential
informant.

kl

At the preliminary hearing Bauer testified, among other things,

that he was addicted to methamphetamine but had not used methamphetamine
on the days of the deliveries.

kl at 527,

328 P.3d at 507. Bauer died before the
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&

case could go to trial.

The state moved to admit Bauer's preliminary hearing

testimony at trial, but the district court denied the motion.
Supreme Court granted the state's permissive appeal.

&

&

The Idaho

The Idaho Supreme

Court reviewed the transcript and determined that Richardson had an adequate
opportunity to cross-examine Bauer at the preliminary hearing.

&

at 529, 328

P.3d at 529. The Court noted that the Confrontation Clause only requires an
"adequate opportunity for cross-examination of a witness, not a perfect one."

kl

Richardson may have preferred to be more aggressive or thorough
with his cross-examination at the preliminary hearing had he known
that Bauer would become unavailable, but the Confrontation
Clause requires only an adequate opportunity for crossexamination of a witness, not a perfect one. See Delaware v.
Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20, 106 S.Ct. 292, 294, 88 L.Ed.2d 15, 19
(1985) ("Generally speaking, the Confrontation Clause guarantees
an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not crossexamination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever
extent, the defense might wish."); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410
U.S. 284, 295, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 1046, 35 L.Ed.2d 297, 309 (1973)
("[T]he right to confront and to cross-examine is not absolute and
may, in appropriate cases, bow to accommodate other legitimate
interests in the criminal process.").

&

Whether a party had an adequate opportunity to cross-examine is

determined on a case-by-case basis.

&

at 529, 328 P.3d at 509.

In Mantz, Karl Hoidal and a group of his friends had been drinking and
decided to drive four-wheelers.
Hoidal's

four-wheeler

ran

into

Mantz, 148 Idaho at 310, 222 P.3d at 478.
Mantz's

truck

and,

during

the

ensuing

confrontation, Mantz fired a handgun near Hoidal's head and threatened him.
The state charged Mantz with aggravated assault.
472-473.

&

&

at 304-305, 222 P.3d at

Hoidal testified at the preliminary hearing but died in an unrelated

accident prior to trial.

&

at 305, 222 P.3d at 473. Pursuant to the state's motion

16

in limine, the district court admitted Hoidal's preliminary hearing testimony at trial.

kl

The jury found Mantz guilty and he appealed.

kl

On appeal, Mantz argued

that admitting Hoidal's preliminary hearing testimony at trial violated his right to
confrontation under the Sixth Amendment.

kl

The Idaho Court of Appeals first

rejected Mantz's argument that preliminary hearings by their very nature do not
provide an adequate opportunity to cross-examine.
475-477.

kl at

307-309, 222 P.3d at

Instead the Idaho Court of Appeals concluded that it should use a

case-by-case approach.

kl at 309,

222 P.3d at 477. At the preliminary hearing,

Hoidal testified that he had been recently charged with DUI.

kl at 310,

222 P .3d

at 478.

Mantz asked Hoidal how many drinks Hoidal consumed on that

occasion.

kl

at 311, 222 P.3d at 479. The state objected.

kl

Mantz argued

that it was relevant to motive and credibility because Hoidal could have been
trying to deflect responsibility for his own conduct leading up to and during the
confrontation with Mantz.
relevance grounds.

kl

kl

The magistrate sustained the objection on

On appeal, Mantz argued he was significantly limited in

his cross-examination because the magistrate sustained this objection.

kl

The

Idaho Court of Appeals disagreed and held that, even if the sustained objection
constituted a limitation, "it certainly was not significant enough to rise to the level
of a constitutional violation." Id.
This was the only limitation imposed by the magistrate. There is no
indication that the magistrate sustained the objection because of
any limited scope or inherent limitations of a preliminary hearing.
Rather, the magistrate sustained the objection on general grounds
of relevance. The relevance of the excluded evidence is highly
questionable. In any event, even if we were to consider the
sustained objection to be a limitation in the Confrontation Clause
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context, it certainly was not significant enough to rise to the level of
a constitutional violation.

Contrary to Sepulveda's argument, neither Mantz nor Richardson "held
that cross-examination into the witness' drug history as a source of potential bias
is a relevant inquiry and the presence of such an inquiry indicates that the
opportunity to cross-examine was adequate." (Appellant's brief, p. 13.) Instead
both Mantz and Richardson held that whether a party had an adequate
opportunity to cross-examine should be determined on a "case-by-case" basis.
Richardson, 156 Idaho at 529, 328 P.3d at 509; Mantz, 148 Idaho at 309, 222
P.3d at 477. And Mantz held that, even if there is a sustained objection to a line
of questioning at the preliminary hearing, the resulting "limitation" on crossexamination may not even be significant enough to rise to the level of a
constitutional violation. Mantz, 148 at 311, 222 P.3d at 479.
Sepulveda claims his case is "more like White, where '[t]he trial
judge ... cut off appellant's cross-examination on an important credibility issue
before the issue could be properly developed."' (Appellant's brief, p. 14 (citing
State v. White, 97 Idaho 708, 713, 551 P.2d 1344, 1349 (1976).) In White, the
cross-examination arguably went directly to the witness' motivation to fabricate a
kidnapping.

See White, 97 Idaho at 712-713, 551 P.2d at 1348-1349. Here,

Sepulveda asked L.M. if she used methamphetamine "a few days prior" to the
day in question.

(2/28/14 Tr., p. 17, Ls. 7-16.)

When the state objected on

relevance grounds, Sepulveda argued it was relevant "as to her state of mind."
(Id.) This question, purportedly attempting to establish L.M.'s "state of mind," did
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not directly go to a motivation to fabricate the assault.

Sepulveda's theory

regarding the attempted strangulation was apparently that L.M. engaged in selfharm. (See 7/25/14 Tr., p. 28, L. 5 - p. 30, L. 2.) Therefore it is not clear how
methamphetamine use a few days prior would go to L.M.'s fabrication of the
assault or even her perception and recollection of the events of the day.
Sepulveda has failed to establish there was any significant limitation in the
scope or nature of his cross-examination. This second factor supports a finding
that Sepulveda had an adequate opportunity for cross-examination

Sepulveda Failed To Show Any New And Significantly Material Line
Of Cross-Examination That Was Not At Least Touched Upon In
The Preliminary Hearing

3.

Sepulveda also failed to "show any new and significantly material line of
cross-examination that was not at least touched upon" in the preliminary hearing.
See Richardson, 156 Idaho at 529, 328 P.3d at 509 (citing Mantz, 148 Idaho at
307, 222 P.3d at 475; Mancusi, 408 U.S. at 215). "The new and significantly
material line of cross-examination principle is related to the 'similar motive'
element of I.R.E. 804(b)(1)." Mantz, 148 Idaho at 307, 222 P.3d at 475. The
question is whether counsel's motive at trial was the same as at the preliminary
hearing.

kl

If defense counsel's motive was to discredit and undermine the

witness at the preliminary hearing, and defense counsel's motive was to discredit
and undermine the witness at the trial-then defense counsel's motive was the
same at both the trial and preliminary hearing. See id. That is the case here.
Sepulveda's motive at both the preliminary hearing and trial was to discredit and
undermine L.M.'s testimony.
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Sepulveda argued that the new material he would have confronted L.M.
with

at trial was

methamphetamine use and evidence that L.M.

had

methamphetamine and other unprescribed drugs in her system on the day of the
incident. (Appellant's brief, pp. 13-14 (citing 8/11/14 Tr., p. 13, Ls. 20-23).) This
argument is unsupported by the record. Sepulveda argued to the district court
that prior to the preliminary hearing he did not have L.M.'s medical records.
(7/25/14 Tr., p. 27, L. 1 - p. 30, L. 2, p. 31, L. 17 - p. 32, L. 5.) In response, the
state clarified that prior to the preliminary hearing Sepulveda did have L.M.'s
medical records from her visit to the hospital. (7/25/14 Tr., p. 32, L. 9 - p. 33, L.
2.)

The medical records were provided prior to the February 28, 2014

preliminary hearing. (See id.; R, pp. 26-29, 34-37.) Therefore, L.M.'s medical
records on the day of the incident were not "new."
If Sepulveda had a new and significantly material line of crossexamination Sepulveda could have presented those claims as evidence at trial.
See Richardson, 156 Idaho at 529, 328 P.3d at 509. Pursuant to Idaho Rule of
Evidence (I.RE.) 806, a defendant may attack an unavailable witness's
credibility at trial "by any evidence which would be admissible for those purposes
if declarant had testified as a witness." JQ;_ (citing I.RE. 806). 'This rule provides
that, when a hearsay statement has been admitted in evidence, 'the credibility of
the declarant may be attacked."' JQ;_ (citing State v. Bingham, 116 Idaho 415,
420, 776 P.2d 424, 429 (1989); I.RE. 806).

Here, that is exactly what

happened. At trial, Sepulveda presented evidence that, on the day of the crime,
L.M. had "mental health" issues. (8/12/14 Tr., p. 281, L. 21 - p. 282, L. 4, p.
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344, L. 16 - p. 346, L. 24.)

Sepulveda called Ms. Wright, a family nurse

practitioner who worked at Riverside Rehab and who treated L.M. (8/12/14 Tr.,
p. 322, L. 19 - p. 325, L. 23.) Sepulveda also testified that L.M. was "suicidal"
and "homicidal"; that he found a methamphetamine pipe on the day in question;
and that L.M. had a "white film" around her mouth. (8/12/14 Tr., p. 219, Ls. 1821, p. 346, L. 15 - p. 348, L. 10.)
Sepulveda failed to show there was any new and significantly material line
of cross-examination that was not at least touched upon in the preliminary
hearing. This third factor also supports a determination that Sepulveda had an
adequate opportunity for cross-examination. The district court did not abuse its
discretion when it granted the state's motion and permitted the introduction of
L.M.'s preliminary hearing transcript at trial.

11.
Sepulveda Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Evidentiary Rulings
A.

Introduction
Sepulveda claims the

district court erred when

it "adopted" the

magistrate's preliminary hearing evidentiary ruling sustaining an objection
regarding whether L.M.'s used methamphetamine "a few days prior" to the
charged crimes. (See Appellant's brief, pp. 16-18.) Sepulveda also argues the
district court erred when it declined to tell the jury that L.M. committed suicide
and the means by which she committed suicide. (Appellant's brief, pp. 16-22.)
Because Sepulveda never asked the district court to rule on L.M.'s
testimony regarding her prior drug use, the alleged error must be analyzed under
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the fundamental error standard. Since evidentiary issues do not rise to the level
of a constitutional error, his unobjected-to claim of evidentiary error does not
meet the fundamental error standard necessary for appellate review. Further,
the district court did not abuse its discretion when it ruled that evidence that L.M.
committed suicide and how she committed suicide was irrelevant.

B.

Standard Of Review
"A trial court has 'broad discretion' in determining whether to admit or

exclude evidence, 'and its judgment in the fact finding role will only be disturbed
on appeal when there has been a clear abuse of discretion."' State v. Abdullah,
158 Idaho 386, _ , 348 P.3d 1, 117 (2015) (citing State v. Joy, 155 Idaho 1, 6,
304 P.3d 276, 281 (2013); State v. Watkins, 148 Idaho 418, 421, 224 P.3d 485,
488 (2009)).

C.

Sepulveda Never Asked The District Court To Rule On The Admissibility
Of Any Testimony Contained In L.M.'s Preliminary Hearing Transcript
And, Because An Evidentiary Issue Cannot Meet The Fundamental Error
Test, His Appeal On This Issue Fails
At the preliminary hearing, the state objected on relevance grounds to

Sepulveda's question regarding L.M.'s use of drugs "a few days prior" to the
charged crimes. (2/28/14 Tr., p. 17, Ls. 7-16.) Sepulveda argued L.M.'s prior
drug use was relevant because it went to L.M.'s "state of mind."

(Id.)

The

magistrate sustained the objection. (Id.) Sepulveda argues that he can appeal
this evidentiary ruling because the district court necessarily "adopted" the
magistrate's evidentiary ruling.

(Appellant's brief, pp. 16-18.)

However, as

Sepulveda himself points out, prior testimony admitted in lieu of live testimony is
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"subject to all proper objections to admissibility at the trial which could have been
raised a[t] the time the testimony was given." (Appellant's brief, p. 17 (citing 40
A.L.R. 4th 514).)

Sepulveda never asked the district court to make any

evidentiary rulings regarding any testimony contained within L.M.'s preliminary
hearing transcript. (See 7/25/14 Tr., p. 27, L. 1 - p. 32, L. 5; 8/11/14 Tr., p. 162,
L. 18 - p. 163, L. 24.)

He never asked the district court to review the

magistrate's evidentiary ruling that the question regarding methamphetamine use
a "few days prior" was not relevant.
Idaho has limited appellate review of unobjected-to error to cases wherein
the defendant has alleged the violation of a constitutionally protected right. State
v. Moore, 158 Idaho 943, _ , 354 P.3d 505, 509 (Ct. App. 2015) (citing State v.
Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 226, 245 P.3d 961, 978 (2008); State v. Kirkwood, 111
Idaho 623, 625-26, 726 P.2d 735, 737-38 (1986)). Where the asserted error
relates not to an infringement upon a constitutional right, but is only a violation of
a rule or statute, the fundamental error doctrine is not invoked.
omitted).

kl

(citations

Sepulveda did not make an evidentiary objection to any portion of

L.M.'s preliminary hearing testimony; therefore, he cannot now raise it on appeal
because the alleged error is only an evidentiary rule violation and not a violation
of a constitutional right.

D.

Sepulveda Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion
When It Declined To Tell The Jury That L.M. Committed Suicide And The
Means By Which She Committed Suicide
Prior to trial, the state moved "to exclude any reference to the cause or

manner of [L.M.'s] death" because "the cause and manner of her death are
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irrelevant for purposes of this trial."

(R., pp. 160-161.)

L.M.'s death was

ultimately determined to have been suicide by overdose of three different drugs.
(8/11/14 Tr., p. 10, L. 18 - p. 11, L. 18, p. 14, Ls. 7-9.) L.M.'s suicide occurred
approximately seven months after the December 27, 2013 attack, and was not
relevant to any portion of the trial. (Id.) Sepulveda objected because he was
concerned that the jury may speculate that Sepulveda had something to do with
L.M.'s death, and he asked the court to consider providing some explanation as
to how and why she died. (8/11/14 Tr., p. 11, L. 21 - p. 12, L. 9.) Sepulveda
also argued that L.M.'s suicide was relevant because it went to her continued
struggle with methamphetamine and drug abuse. (8/11/14 Tr., p. 13, L. 20 - p.
14, L. 6.) The state pointed out that it would have been misleading to say that
L.M. overdosed on methamphetamine because two of the drugs she overdosed
on were drugs that were prescribed. (8/11/14 Tr., p. 14, Ls. 7-20.) The district
court agreed with the state and held:
THE COURT:
Okay. I think that [the state's] suggestion is
probably the best approach here for the court to simply indicate
that [L.M.] has passed away in the interim and that her passing
doesn't have anything whatsoever to do with this case and leave it
at that.
That would seem to be the best balance I can strike here.
Because I agree that the cause of death just doesn't have anything
to do with anything in terms of Mr. Sepulveda's guilt or innocence
of the charges against him.
(8/11/14 Tr., p. 14, L. 21 - p. 15, L. 7.)
On appeal, Sepulveda argues that L.M.'s suicide is somehow relevant to
her credibility regarding events that occurred seven months before her suicide.
(See Appellant's brief, pp. 18-22.) Sepulveda's argument appears to be that
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because L.M. had methamphetamine in her system when she committed
suicide, it shows she was struggling with methamphetamine use on the day in
question. (See id.) Sepulveda claims that evidence of L.M.'s suicide contradicts
her preliminary hearing testimony. (Id. (citing State v. Karpach, 146 Idaho 736,
739-741, 202 P.3d 1282, 1285-1287 (Ct. App. 2009)).
Sepulveda has failed to articulate what portion of L.M.'s testimony was
contradicted by her suicide seven months later.

(Id.)

Sepulveda does not

explain how a suicide somehow impeaches testimony regarding events seven
months prior to the suicide. Instead he insinuates that the suicide was somehow
caused by or related to L.M.'s use of methamphetamine. Sepulveda presents no
evidence that L.M.'s overdose was related to any drug problem. Instead, the
information in the record indicates that it was an intentional suicide that involved
methamphetamine and two different prescribed drugs.
The district court did not err when it instructed the jury that L.M.'s death
had nothing to do with the case or Sepulveda. (8/11/14 Tr., p. 163, Ls. 8-24.)
THE COURT:
Ladies and gentlemen, you have just heard
preliminary hearing testimony by [L.M.].
There was some discussion during the jury selection
process of the fact that [L.M.] had passed away and would not be
here to testify live and in person, and that's indeed why her
testimony was - her preliminary hearing testimony has been
presented to you today.
I would instruct you that the circumstance doesn't have
anything to do with this case whatsoever, and they don't have
anything to do whatsoever with Mr. Sepulveda. It's simply not
something that you should concern yourselves with at all as you
think about and ultimately deliberate upon this case. It's just simply
not a relevant topic at all to your task as jurors.

25

(Id.)

Even if the jury instruction was error, it was harmless error.

"Typically,

under the harmless error test, once the defendant shows that a constitutional
violation occurred, the State has the burden of demonstrating beyond a
reasonable doubt that the violation did not contribute to the jury's verdict." State
v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445,472, 272 P.3d 417,444 (2012). Here, evidence that
L.M. committed suicide seven months after the date of the attacks would not
have contributed to the jury's verdict. The state presented substantial evidence
of the domestic violence and injury to child counts.

In addition to L.M.'s

testimony, the state presented the testimony of Ms. Grainger, the neighbor who
heard the children and L.M. scream for their lives; Ms. Grainger's 911 call; and
the paramedic who observed swelling under L.M.'s neck and chin. Sepulveda
admitted on cross-examination that his story had changed over time.
Regarding the influencing a witness and attempted violation of no contact
order charges, the state presented recorded telephone conversations; the
testimony's of Ms. Welch and Ms. Cameron who both testified that Sepulveda
wanted them to influence L.M.'s testimony; and Sepulveda admitted he
attempted to violate the no contact orders. L.M.'s preliminary hearing testimony
was not used to prove these charges. Even if there was error, it was harmless
error.
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111.
Sepulveda Has Failed To Show His Double Jeopardy Rights Under The Idaho
Constitution Were Violated And Failed To Show Fundamental Error

A.

Introduction
Sepulveda contends, for the first time on appeal, that his double jeopardy

rights under the Idaho Constitution were violated because "the means by which
the intimidating the witness charge was alleged was the same as each of the
charges alleging an attempt to violate the no contact order - contacting a person
and asking them to contact L.M. on the defendant's behalf." (Appellant's brief,
pp. 25-26) (citation omitted). Sepulveda failed to raise this claim below, and he
has failed to show that it constitutes fundamental error.

B.

Standard Of Review
"It is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely

objection must be made in the trial court before an issue is preserved for
appeal." State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000).
Absent a timely objection, the appellate courts of this state will only review an
alleged error under the fundamental error doctrine. Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245
P.3d at 979.
Whether a defendant's prosecution complies with the constitutional
protection against double jeopardy is a question of law subject to free review.
State v. Santana, 135 Idaho 58, 63, 14 P.3d 378, 383 (Ct. App. 2000). The
interpretation and application of a statute is also a question of law subject to de
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novo review. State v. Jones, 151 Idaho 943, 946, 265 P.3d 1155, 1158 (Ct. App.
2011 ).

C.

Sepulveda Has Failed To Show That Felony Intimidating A Witness Is A
Lesser Included Offense Of Misdemeanor Attempted Violation Of A No
Contact Order
Review under the fundamental error doctrine requires Sepulveda to

demonstrate the error he alleges:

"(1) violates one or more of [his] unwaived

constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional
information not contained in the appellate record, including information as to
whether the failure to object was a tactical decision); and (3) was not harmless."
Perry, 150 Idaho at 228, 245 P.3d at 980.
Sepulveda argues his unwaived constitutional right to be free from double
jeopardy was violated, contending that, under the facts of this case, intimidating
a witness is an included offense of violating a no contact order. (See Appellant's
brief, pp. 22-27.) "There are two theories under which a particular offense may
be determined to be a lesser included of a charged offense." State v. SanchezCastro, 157 Idaho 647, 648, 339 P.3d 372, 373 (2014) (quoting State v. Curtis,
130 Idaho 522, 524, 944 P.2d 119, 121 (1997)). Those theories are referred to
as the statutory theory and the pleading theory. Sanchez-Castro, 157 Idaho at
648, 339 P.3d at 373 (citations omitted).

Idaho appellate courts apply the

Blockburger5 test in analyzing whether an offense is an included offense under

5

Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
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the statutory theory.

kl

(citing State v. Flegel, 151 Idaho 525, 527, 261 P.3d

519, 521 (2011)). Under this test, an offense is considered included in another
offense "if all the elements required to sustain a conviction of the lesser included
offense are included within the elements needed to sustain a conviction of the
greater offense." Flegel, 151 Idaho at 527, 261 P.3d at 521 (quoting State v.
McCormick, 100 Idaho 111, 114, 594 P.2d 149, 152 (1979)).

However, on

appeal, Sepulveda only raises a claim under the pleading theory. (Appellant's
brief, pp. 22-27.)
Idaho is among several jurisdictions which have, at least occasionally,
utilized the "pleading theory" to determine whether the conviction

and

punishment for two offenses violates the double jeopardy clause of respective
state constitutions. See State v. Corbus, 151 Idaho 368, 372-375, 256 P.3d 776,
780-84 (Ct. App. 2011). 6 Under the "pleading theory," a court must consider
whether the terms of the charging document allege that both offenses arose from
the same factual circumstance such that one offense was the means by which
the other was committed.

l!;L

Because the pleading theory relies on an

examination of the charging Information, it generally provides a broader definition
of greater and lesser included offenses than a statutory theory approach. l!;L
The pleading theory holds "that an offense is an included offense if it is alleged in

6

In a post-Corbus case, the Idaho Court of Appeals determined that the Idaho
Supreme Court's continued application of the "pleading theory" means that the
"pleading theory" is the only theory to be applied when addressing a double
jeopardy claim under the Idaho Constitution. State v. Moad, 156 Idaho 654, 658
n.3, 330 P.3d 400, 404 n.3 (Ct. App. 2014); see also Sanchez-Castro, 157 Idaho
at 648-649, 339 P.3d at 373-374. The state is unaware of the United States
Supreme Court ever applying the "pleading theory."
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the information [or indictment] as a means or element of the commission of the
higher offense."

Sanchez-Castro, 157 Idaho at 648, 339 P.3d at 373 (citing

Sivakv. State, 112 Idaho 197,211,731 P.2d 192,206 (1986)).
Sepulveda argues that "the

language in the charging

document

demonstrates that the means by which the Information alleged the intimating the
witness charge was the same as the means for each of the other two charges."
(Appellant's brief, pp. 24-25.) "As such, the means by which the intimidating the
witness charge was alleged was the same as each of the charges alleging an
attempt to violate the no contact order - contacting a person and asking them to
contact L.M. on the defendant's behalf."

(Appellant's brief, pp. 25-26 (citing

Corbus, 151 Idaho 374-375, 256 P.3d at 782-783).)
As pied, Mr. Sepulveda is alleged to have attempted to violate the
no contact order in two instances, each time by trying to influence
L.M.'s testimony. Thus, the intimidating charge is the means by
which each attempt to violate the no contact order charges were
committed.
(Appellant's brief, p. 26 (citing R., p. 278).) Sepulveda's argument appears to be
that because the attempted violation of a no contact order and the intimidating a
witness occurred within the same course of conduct one is barred by double
jeopardy. This is incorrect. "Those familiar with criminal procedure know that
when there is evidence indicating that a defendant committed more than one
offense during a course of conduct, the prosecuting attorney can seek an
indictment charging each of those crimes as separate counts." Flegel, 151 Idaho
at 530, 261 P.3d at 524.
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Under Idaho's pleading theory, whether one crime is a lesser included
offense of another crime can be determined from the face of the record simply
by reading the information charging each crime. State v. McKinney, 153 Idaho
837, 841, 291 P.3d 1036, 1040 (2013). The face of the record does not show
that, as pied, felony intimidating a witness is a lesser included offense of
attempted violation of a no-contact order. 7 (See R., p. 278; 8/11/14 Tr., p. 122,
L. 8 - p. 123, L. 1.) The information, as amended, states:
COUNT I
That the Defendant CESAR ANTONIO SEPULVEDA, on or
between the 29th day of December, 2013 and the 14th day of
January, 2014, in the County of Ada, State of Idaho, did willfully
intimidate, influence, impede, deter, obstruct, or prevent, and or did
attempt to intimidate, influence, impede, deter, obstruct, or prevent
a witness, potential witness, and/or person the Defendant believes
to be a witness, from testifying freely, fully and truthfully in a
criminal proceeding, to-wit: Ada County case number CR-FE-20130018132, in which the Defendant was charged with the crimes of
Attempted Strangulation and Possession of a Controlled
Substance, by asking another person and/or persons to speak with
[L.M.] and ask her to tell the court that she injured herself, that the
allegations of attempted strangulation are false, and/or that her
medications are to blame for what happened, and/or to direct her
not to appear for court. 8
COUNT II
That the Defendant CESAR ANTONIO SEPULVEDA, on or about
the 30th day of December, 2013, in the County of Ada, State of
7

Despite the Idaho authorities uniformly applying the "pleading theory" in the
context of lesser included offenses, Sepulveda argues that felony intimidation of
a witness is somehow a lesser included offense of misdemeanor attempted
violation of a no-contact order. (See Appellant's brief, p. 27.)
8
The district court, based on Sepulveda's motion, struck the "attempt" language
from Count I. (8/8/14 Tr., p. 47, L. 10 - p. 48, L. 13.) The language "and or did
attempt to intimidate, influence, impede, deter, obstruct, or prevent" was struck
from the Information. (Compare R., p. 278 with 8/11/14 Tr., p. 122, L. 8 - p. 123,
L. 1.)
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Idaho, attempted to have contact with [L.M.] in violation of a no
contact order issued in Ada County case number CR-FE-2130018132, where the Defendant was charged with the offense of
Attempted Strangulation, by calling [L.M.'s] sister and asking her to
pass certain messages on to [L.M.].
COUNT Ill
That the Defendant CESAR ANTONIO SEPULVEDA, on or about
the 2nd day of January, 2014, in the County of Ada, State of Idaho,
attempted to have contact with [L.M.] in violation of a no contact
order issued in Ada County case number CR-FE-213-0018132,
where the Defendant was charged with the offense of Attempted
Strangulation, by calling a Lisa Cameron and asking her to contact
L.M. on his behalf.
(R., p. 278.) From the face of the information, not all the elements of intimidating

a witness are pied in the attempted violation of a no contact order counts,
therefore, the felony intimidating a witness was not pied "as a means or element
of the commission of the higher offense." See Sanchez-Castro, 157 Idaho at
648, 339 P.3d at 373.
Intimidation of a witness was not the "means or element" by which
Sepulveda committed attempted violation of a no contact order.

The Idaho

Supreme Court recently explained that simply because two counts refer to the
same actions, those two counts don't necessarily violate double jeopardy.
The crime of trafficking in methamphetamine is committed when a
person "knowingly delivers, or brings into this state, or [ ] is
knowingly in actual or constructive possession of, twenty-eight (28)
grams or more of methamphetamine or amphetamine or of any
mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of
methamphetamine or amphetamine." l.C. § 2732B(a)(4). Knowingly
possessing a specified quantity of methamphetamine is one
manner of committing the crime of trafficking. The language upon
which Defendant apparently relies states that he and others
conspired "to traffic in a controlled substance, by knowingly
possessing methamphetamine." The words "by knowingly
possessing methamphetamine" were not alleged as the means by
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which the Defendant and others were alleged to have committed
the conspiracy. The words obviously referred to the object of the
conspiracy-they conspired to traffic in a controlled substance by
knowingly possessing methamphetamine.
Sanchez-Castro, 157 Idaho at 649, 339 P.3d at 374.

Sepulveda's manner of

committing intimidating a witness was trying to get L.M. to "tell the court that she
injured herself, that the allegations of attempted strangulation are false, and/or
that her medications are to blame for what happened, and/or to direct her not to
appear for court." (R., p. 278.) This count makes no reference to the existence
of a no contact order.

(Id.)

The means by which Sepulveda committed

attempted violation of a no contact order was by attempting to violate the terms
of no contact order. (Id.) This count makes no reference to whether L.M. was a
witness or whether Sepulveda intended to prevent her from testifying. (Id.) The
state could not have charged intimidating a witnesses as a "lesser included"
offense of attempted violation of a no contact order, or vice versa.

Simply

because all these counts reference phone calls does not mean that one crime
was an element or means by which the other crimes were committed.
Further, as pied, Count I cannot be a lesser included offense of Counts II
and Ill because the timeframe of Count I exceed those of Counts II and Ill. (See
R., p. 278.) Intimidation of a witness was alleged to have taken place between

the "29th day of December, 2013 and the 14th day of January, 2014."

(Id.)

Counts II and Ill were alleged to have occurred on or about December 30, 2013
and January 2, 2014, respectively.

(Id.)

The timeframe of the actions

encompassed by Count I, on the face of the Information, exceeds those of
Counts II and Ill.
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Intimidation of a witness is not the means or element by which Sepulveda
committed attempted violation of a no contact order. Because Sepulveda cannot
show that there was any violation of an unwaived constitutional right, Sepulveda
has failed to show fundamental error.
IV.
Sepulveda's Cumulative Error Claim Fails Because He Has Failed To Show
Error, Much Less Multiple Errors To Cumulate
Under the doctrine of cumulative error, a series of errors, harmless in and
of themselves, may in the aggregate show the absence of a fair trial. However, a
necessary predicate to the application of the doctrine is a finding of more than
one error."

State v. Parker, 157 Idaho 132, 149, 334 P.3d 806, 823 (2014)

(quoting Perry, 150 Idaho at 230, 245 P.3d at 982).

Because Sepulveda has

failed to show any error, there is no error to cumulate in this case. Alternatively,
given the weight of the evidence presented that Sepulveda was guilty of felony
intimidating a witness, attempted violation of a no contact order, domestic battery
and injury to child, the alleged errors, even in "aggregate do not show the
absence of a fair trial." Parker, 157 Idaho at 149, 334 P.3d at 823. Sepulveda
has therefore failed to show any basis for a new trial.
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CONCLUSION

The state respectfully requests this Court affirm Sepulveda's convictions.
DATED this 20th day of November, 2015.
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